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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following example: an elderly patient with advanced
Alzheimer's disease dies after being beaten and raped while in an
assisted living facility.1 The beneficiaries bring a wrongful death claim
against the owner of the facility.2 The facility then seeks to compel
arbitration of the claim based on the arbitration clause in the patient's
admissions contract.3  The court responds by ordering the dispute to
arbitration, over the objection of the beneficiaries.4
Because the above example invokes genuine sympathy for the
family involved and may result in a potentially large award for the
beneficiaries, the facility likely does not want the case to be tried by a
jury of peers. Many nursing homes already face significant financial
challenges with complex Medicare payment systems that often leave
them with hefty bills and no one to pay. 5 However, no amount of
financial difficulty justifies inserting a provision in an admissions
contract that waives the right to a jury trial for unanticipated, negligent
acts leading to death.
Predispute mandatory arbitration agreements inclusive of wrongful
death nursing home claims are simply wrong. The validity of any such
agreement in a health care setting presents serious problems due to the
vulnerability of patients, the patient's immediate need to receive health
care services, the lack of meaningful choice of facilities under which to
receive care, and the disparity of power.6  The problems with the
agreements in wrongful death actions are greatly increased when
considering the gross negligence that may be involved, which cannot be
anticipated by either the patient or the patient's family.
7
1. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 575
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 576.
4. Id. at 579.
5. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADvISORY COMMISSION (MEDPAC), REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY (Mar. 2008), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/
Mar08_EntireReport.pdf (making recommendations to Congress regarding changes to
Medicare payment policies in a 379 page report reflecting the complexity of the Medicare
system); Thomas Day, About Nursing Homes, http://www.longtermcarelink.net/eldercare/
nursing-home.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2008) (discussing problems facing nursing
homes including the rising costs of care due to lawsuits as well as a shortage of staff
which may lead to negligent care).
6. See Laura M. Owings & Mark N. Gelle, The Inherent Unfairness of Arbitration
Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, TENN. BAR J. 20 (March 2007).
7. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (providing an example of gross
negligence on the part of the nursing home).
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Challenges to all mandatory arbitration agreements are on the rise.8
Similarly, challenges to mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing
home contracts have increased, with a plethora of litigation from 2005 to
the present. 9 The single largest reason for the increase appears to be
challenges to arbitration clauses involving wrongful death claims, which
have tripled since 2005. In twelve of the cases litigated in 2007, six
upheld arbitration provisions, some by severing unconscionable portions,
and six declared the arbitration agreements unenforceable.' ° These cases
reveal a split of court opinion regarding mandatory arbitration
8. F. Paul Bland, Leslie Bailey, & Michael Lucas, Selected Arbitration Decisions
Since September 2005, Practising Law Institute: Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series, Order No. 11165 399, 403 (Mar.-May 2007). The increase in nursing
home litigation in the last five to ten years mirrors that of all challenges to the
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses. Id. In the last two years, more than 500
new judicial opinions on mandatory arbitration have been published. Id.
9. See MN MedInvest Co., L.P. v. Estate of Nichols ex rel. Nichols, 908 So. 2d
1178, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding an arbitration clause in a suit brought
on behalf of a minor child by her mother for wrongful death, negligence, and breach of
fiduciary duty); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 525 (Miss. 2005)
(finding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable and therefore enforceable in a
wrongful death action); Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs,
LLC, No. 3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007) (finding that
the signature of the patient's daughter on the arbitration agreement was binding since her
mother was incapacitated and, thus, upholding the arbitration agreement). Compare with
Noland Health Services, Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681, 690 (Ala. 2007) (finding, in a 5-
3 opinion, that a daughter-in-law's signature as responsible party could not be interpreted
as the patient's intent to be bound by an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death
action); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that an arbitration clause was void against public policy in a
negligent care action); Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, LLC v. Lewis, 923 So. 2d 998,
1002 (Miss. 2006) (holding that a conservator was not bound by an arbitration clause in a
negligence action against the nursing home when he refused to sign the arbitration
clause); see also Sylvia Hsieh, Nursing Home Suits Heat Up, LAWYERS USA, Mar. 24,
2008 (discussing the new flurry of litigation over mandatory arbitration provisions in
nursing home admissions contracts).
10. For cases upholding arbitration agreements, see Carraway v. Beverly Enters.
Ala., Inc., 978 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 2007); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel.
Graham, 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied, 967 So. 2d 196 (Fla.
2007); Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 2007); Covenant Health Rehab of
Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC
v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007),
cert. granted, 977 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. 2008); Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health &
Rehab of Holly Springs, LLC, No. 3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141 (N.D. Miss. Oct.
22, 2007).
For cases invalidating arbitration agreements, see Noland Health Servs., Inc. v.
Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2007); Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 648 S.E.2d 430 (Ga.
App. 2007); Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., No. 2006-A-0039, 2007 WL
2296459 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007); Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238
S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App. 2007), rev. denied, 238 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2008); Texas Cityview
Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App. 2007).
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agreements in nursing home wrongful death actions, and the need for
courts to further clarify their jurisprudence. The increase in litigation
also serves as a wake-up call for nursing homes to adjust their
admissions procedures and agreements, and for legislatures to join in the
debate concerning the validity of arbitration agreements in nursing home
admissions contracts.' 1
This article reviews the current increase in litigation surrounding
wrongful death claims against nursing homes. First, the article briefly
summarizes the history of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")12 and its
impact on state laws that govern arbitration agreements.1 3 Second, the
article reviews current court interpretation of arbitration agreements in
wrongful death actions against nursing homes in various jurisdictions,
including the authority of the signor of the agreement, the applicable
state or federal law governing the arbitration agreement, and the
unconscionability of the agreement.1 4  Finally, the article proposes
changes in current nursing home admissions contracts to make them at
least "more" right. It first advocates that wrongful death claims be
excluded from predispute mandatory arbitration agreements or, in the
alternative, that nursing home admissions contracts be drafted with clear
and just provisions that allow for important relief for beneficiaries when
litigating a wrongful death claim.'
5
II. BACKGROUND
While courts in many states have not had the occasion to decide
whether mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts are
enforceable, other. courts have decided the issue, with mixed results.
16
The burden of showing a valid arbitration agreement is on the party
seeking to enforce arbitration.' 7  In determining whether to compel
arbitration, a court considers the following factors: the federal
government's policy favoring arbitration; whether the admissions
contract is valid; whether the admissions contract is signed by a person in
11. Congress recently introduced legislation entitled the "Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act" to address concerns over mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing
home contracts, but the bill has yet to become law. S. 2838, 11 0 th Cong. (2008).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2007).
13. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 31-207 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 208-335 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs, LLC, No.
3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007) (upholding an
arbitration agreement). Cf SA-PG-Ocala, LLC v. Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration).
17. E.g., Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002); In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 286 (Tex. App. 2005).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
authority; and whether the arbitration agreement lacks procedural and
substantive unconscionability. These issues will be discussed in the
remainder of this article.
A. Federal Law Governing Arbitration Agreements
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
enforceability of an arbitration clause in a health care contract.'
8
However, Congress has specifically supported arbitration through the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which underscores a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration.' 9 The FAA establishes that "[a] written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy ...
shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
20
The Court determined that the purpose of the FAA was to "reverse
the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ... and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.'
Furthermore, the Court established that questions regarding the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. The Court broadly interpreted the phrase "involving
commerce" in 9 U.S.C. § 2 as any activity "affecting commerce. 23
Similarly, the Court held that "Congress' Commerce Clause power 'may
be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon
interstate commerce' if in the aggregate the economic activity in question
would represent 'a general practice ... subject to federal control."'
24
The above examples reflect the Court's readiness to apply the FAA to
most any contract by finding that the subject matter relates to interstate
commerce.
18. See Kathrine Kuhn Galle, Comment: The Appearance of Impropriety: Making
Agreements to Arbitrate in Health Care contracts More Palatable, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 969, 984 (2004).
19. See 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2007).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
21. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000); see also
Elizabeth K. Stanley, Parties' Defenses to Binding Arbitration Agreements in the Health
Care Field & The Operation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 591,
599 (2007).
22. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
23. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995).
24. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003) (citing Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
[Vol. 113:2
2008] WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS FOR NURSING HOME PATIENTS 533
B. State Law Versus Federal Law
Against the backdrop of the FAA, most states have FAA-companion
25legislation that governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Like federal law, state companion laws similarly express a strong policy
favoring arbitration and guide the courts to resolve doubts concerning the
scope of arbitration in favor of arbitration.26 However, a party cannot be
compelled to arbitrate a dispute if it has not agreed by contract to
arbitration.27
In regard to whether federal or state law applies to a particular
arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts
state laws that are more restrictive than the FAA but permits state laws
that broaden the scope of the FAA.28 According to the Court, states may
regulate arbitration agreements under general contract law principles,
including allowing for the contract defenses of fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.2 9  In addition to federal preemption issues, an
arbitration agreement may be held void to the extent that it conflicts with
state law. 30  Accordingly, an arbitration agreement may be subject to
both state and federal laws and be found inapplicable under either.
25. E.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 572.08-572.30 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Kennedy, Matthews, Landis, Healy & Pecora, Inc. v. Young, 524
N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. App. 1994).
27. See, e.g., Schoenbom v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Minn.
App. 1993).
28. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); see also Galle, supra note
18, at 978 (arguing that states may apply principles of contract law to determine the
validity of a contract, but that the FAA preempts statutory schemes that are more
restrictive).
29. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989). The Court applied California law, as stated in the contract, to stay the
arbitration pending litigation against a third party. Id. However, the Court's holding is
interpreted by some to be the minority view among many other Supreme Court holdings
that definitively conclude that the FAA preempts state law. See THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 175-76 (West, 4th ed. 2007) (noting that
the holding in Volt represents strict adherence to principles of contract). Carbonneau
asserts that the "federalism trilogy" sets a strong precedent that the FAA preempts state
law. Id at 175-76 (citing the three cases in the trilogy as Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984), and Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
Cf Alexander v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club LLC, 649 N.W.2d 464, 467
(Minn. App. 2002) (asserting that states may regulate contracts, and general contract
principles apply to arbitration clauses); Stanley, supra note 21, at 607 (quoting Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995), as finding that "[s]tates may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles").
30. See, e.g., Minnesota Cmty. College Faculty Ass'n v. State, 562 N.W.2d 685, 689
(Minn. App. 1997) (denying a motion to compel arbitration between a faculty association
and MnSCU regarding faculty appointments on the grounds that sole authority to make
all faculty appointments was given to MnSCU under Minnesota Statute § 43A.06, subd.
1(c) (1994)).
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III. CURRENT COURT INTERPRETATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Many state courts have not specifically addressed the validity of
predispute mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts;
however, an analysis of court decisions that have considered the issue
serves as a guide to current court interpretation of arbitration clauses. In
2007, courts in Alabama, 31 Florida,
32 Georgia,33 Massachusetts, 34
Mississippi,35 Ohio, 36 Tennessee, 37 and Texas38 decided the issue of the
3 1. See Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Ala., Inc., 978 So. 2d 27 (Ala. 2007) (upholding
an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death action where the brother signed the
admissions contract as "authorized agent" on behalf of his sister and the agreement was
not unconscionable); Noland Health Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2007)
(affirming a denial of the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration when finding that
the daughter-in-law's signature on the admissions agreement did not bind the patient to
arbitration and that the administrator of the estate who brought suit did not manifest
assent to the arbitration clause by previously filing a breach of contract complaint prior to
the patient's death).
32. See Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (invalidating an arbitration agreement when the nursing home required the
arbitration be governed by the American Health Lawyers Association, which required a
finding of negligence under a clear and convincing evidence standard as opposed to a
preponderance of the evidence standard as found in the Florida's Nursing Home
Resident's Act); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d
574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding an arbitration agreement, after severing a
provision limiting damages, by finding that even though the patient did not sign the
agreement, she was bound to it as an intended third-party beneficiary).
33. See Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 648 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding an arbitration agreement was not enforceable against the patient's estate when
the husband had no authority to act as an agent of his wife when signing the admissions
agreement).
34. See Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 2007) (upholding an arbitration
agreement where the clause was well drafted and the son who signed the admissions
contract understood the provision and possessed a durable power of attorney).
35. See Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss.
2007) (severing a provision that limited damages but otherwise enforcing an arbitration
agreement after finding it was not unconscionable); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v.
Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007)
(holding that the arbitration agreement was binding against the patient and by extension
her third-party beneficiaries in the wrongful death action).
36. See Barnes v. Andover Vill. Ret. Cmty., Ltd., No. 2006-A-0039, 2007 WL
2296459 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007) (declaring the arbitration clause in the
admissions contract unconscionable and unenforceable but remanding to allow the
nursing home to present supplemental information that rebuts the unconscionability
argument as required by statute).
37. See Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-R11-CV, 2007 WL
3284669, at *4 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007) (holding that an arbitration agreement was a "health
care decision" and thus the attorney-in-fact was authorized to enter into the agreement,
but remanding the case to permit discovery on the issue of unconscionability).
38. See Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App. 2007)
(vacating an arbitration award because the wife had no authority to bind the patient to the
admissions contract and allowing the wife of the deceased patient to proceed with a
medical malpractice action); Texas Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345
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enforceability of predispute mandatory arbitration clauses in wrongful
death claims. Federal courts also have recently begun to decide the issue
of enforceability, using a similar analysis to that of state courts.3 9 First,
courts determine whether the FAA, another federal law, or a state law
governs the arbitration agreement, generally holding that the FAA
applies. 40 Second, courts apply a two-prong test that asks: (1) whether
the arbitration agreement itself is valid; and (2) whether the disputed
issue falls within the scope of the agreement.4'
In regard to the first prong, courts consider several issues to
determine whether the arbitration agreement in a nursing home contract
is valid including: the authority of the signor of the admissions
agreement, the formatting of the agreement, the admissions process, and
the fairness of the terms. 42  Most of the litigation concerns the first
43prong. Few courts focus on the second prong when interpreting the
validity of arbitration clauses in wrongful death claims, so it will not be
fully discussed here.4
A few courts add a third step in the analysis by determining whether
one of the parties waived the right to arbitration or whether other legal
considerations invalidate the arbitration agreement.45  For example,
(Tex. App. 2007) (denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration when the
daughter of the patient had no authority to bind the patient or the patient's estate when
signing the nursing home agreement).
39. See Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc. v. Powell, 244 F. App'x 577 (5th Cir. 2007)
(reversing summary judgment for the plaintiff when it found that material facts existed as
to whether the nursing home adequately explained the provisions of the admissions
contract to an illiterate patient); Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly
Springs, LLC, No. 3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22,
2007) (finding an arbitration agreement enforceable against the signatory daughter as
surrogate for her incapacitated mother).
Compare Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005), with
Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 244 F. App'x 577 (following a similar analysis as prior state
court decisions).
40. E.g., Vicksburg Partners, L.P., 911 So. 2d 507 (representing the general rule that
nursing home arbitration agreements affect interstate commerce in the aggregate and
holding that the FAA applies).
41. See, e.g., Gulledge, 2007 WL 3102141, at *1; Sikes, 238 S.W.3d at 809; Trinity
Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720, at *2
(Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007); see also Stanley, supra note 21, at 621.
42. Stanley, supra note 21, at 621-34; see also Christopher B. Hopkins, The Perils of
Enforcing "Favored" Arbitration, 24 No. 1 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 30, 34-40 (2005).
43. For a discussion on how the courts determine validity, see infra notes 47-205 and
accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC, 2007 WL 2421720, at *7 (interpreting
the language in the arbitration agreement of "all claims ... shall be resolved by binding
arbitration" as encompassing the plaintiff's wrongful death claim and, thus the claim fell
within the scope of the agreement).
45. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 577
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The three-prong test in Florida is: "(1) whether a valid written
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Florida's Third District Court of Appeals recently held that a nursing
home waives its right to arbitration in a wrongful death action by
engaging in extensive discovery prior to moving to compel arbitration.46
A. Applicable Federal or State Law
As a preliminary matter, courts must determine whether the FAA,
another federal law, or a state law applies to the arbitration agreement.
In order for the FAA to apply, the arbitration agreement must "affect
interstate commerce. 47 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of commerce, courts have generally held nursing
home contracts to be transactions involving "interstate commerce. 48
However, courts have held that the FAA does not apply when it is:
(1) preempted by another federal law; or (2) preempted by state law.49 In
Bruner v. Timberland Manor, L.P.,5° the patient's daughter signed an
arbitration agreement, which stated in at least eight different places that
"the laws of the State of Oklahoma" governed the agreement. 5' The
nursing home presented evidence showing its operations entailed
interstate commerce.52 However, the court found that the nursing home
did not engage in interstate commerce, noting that neither Congress nor
the United States Supreme Court have declared that Medicare or
Medicaid funding is an exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power."
agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the
right to arbitration was waived." Id. Mississippi has a similar third step that asks,
"whether legal constraint external to the parties' agreement foreclosed arbitration of those
claims." Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC, 2007 WL 2421720, at *2 (quoting East Ford,
Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (Miss. 2002)). For a similar case, see Gulledge, 2007
WL 3102141, at *1 (referring to a similar prong of whether "any federal statute or policy
renders the claims nonarbitrable"); Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc. v. Powell, 244 F. App'x
577, 579 (5th Cir. 2007) (using a similar test).
46. Estate of Orlanis ex rel. Marks v. Oakwood Terrace Skilled Nursing & Rehab.
Ctr., 971 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (engaging in interrogatories, requests
for document production, and notices of production to non-parties).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2007). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 515 (Miss. 2005)
(applying the aggregate affects test and finding nursing homes receive supplies from out-
of-state vendors and payments from out-of-state insurance companies, including
Medicare/Medicaid); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC, 2007 WL 2421720, at *2 (citing
Stephens, 911 So. 2d at 515).
49. See infra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
50. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor, L.P., 155 P.3d 16 (Okla. 2006).
51. Id. at 30 (noting that the patient died of malnutrition).
52. Id. at 26-31.
53. Id. at 29-30. The court expounded that the federal government utilizes "health
and safety" regulations under the SSA to monitor Medicaid programs at the state level.
Id. at 26. Thus, because federal funds are withheld unless states comply with certain
regulations, Congress is exercising its spending power, not its commerce power. Id.
Many of the Medicaid requirements are left to the states to legislate as they see fit, such
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One justice wrote that, "[t]he nursing home admission contract in this
case involves a profoundly local transaction-in-state nursing home care
provided to an Oklahoma individual by an Oklahoma entity licensed
under Okalahoma law.,
54
Moreover, the court determined that the FAA may be preempted by
conflicting federal law, and thus found that the Social Security Act
("SSA") regulating Medicaid provisions was the governing law in the
case.5 5  Consequently, under the SSA, the court allowed state law to
apply to judicial review of health care contracts.56 By ultimately finding
that state law applied, the court then favored the language of the more
specific Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act ("NHCA"), which precluded
waiver of rights for negligent acts, over the FAA state-counterpart, the
Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act. 57 Under the NHCA, the court found
that the waiver of a right to a jury trial was null and void; therefore, it
held the arbitration agreement unenforceable 8
The court in In re Kepka59 found that the federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act ("MFA") prevented FAA preemption of notice
requirements in a state statute.60 The court held that the nursing home
contract "regulated the business of insurance" as required by the MFA.61
Because the MFA applied, the FAA could not be used to preempt a state
statute requiring that the arbitration agreement contain written notice in
as whether binding arbitration will be permitted. Id. Since states are given authority to
enact certain Medicaid regulations and Congress is exercising its spending power, not its
commerce power, the court concluded that the SSA, and by extension state law, applied.
Id. at 31.
54. Id. at 31-32. The court summarized its reasons for finding the FAA did not
apply as: (1) the arbitration agreement specified that Oklahoma law would govern;
(2) Congress regulates nursing homes through its spending power, not commerce power;
(3) Congress' nursing home regulations leave decisions regarding judicial review of
nursing home claims up to the states; and (4) insufficient evidence exists to connect the
admissions contract with interstate commerce. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 24-26. The court stated that "like any statutory directive the FAA's
mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command." Id. at 25 (citing
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987)).
56. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor, L.P., 155 P.3d 16, 31 (Okla. 2006). The court
pointed to a memorandum from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that
stated, "[u]nder Medicaid, we will defer to State law as to whether or not such binding
arbitration agreements are permitted .. " Id. at 26; see also § 1919(c)(2), (f)(3); 42
U.S.C. § 1369r(c)(2), (0(3); 42 C.F.R. § 431.245 (2007) (the Social Security Act and
corresponding regulations).
57. Bruner, 155 P.3d at 25.
58. Id. at31.
59. In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App. 2005).
60. Id. at 287-88.
61. Id. at 288 (finding that the purpose of the act is to protect the relationship
between the insured and the insurer that provided, in this case, medical insurance).
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ten-point boldface type explaining that the agreement to arbitrate was a
waiver of rights.
62
In addition to determining that other federal law may preempt
application of the FAA, at least two courts have elected to apply state
law, as opposed to the FAA, by pointing to the fact that the FAA was not
intended to preempt all state law governing arbitration.63  In Owens v.
National Health Corp.,64 the court summarily held that Tennessee law,
not the FAA, applied by the party's own terms in the contract.65  The
court cited the United States Supreme Court in Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University6 to support its position that the parties may elect to apply
state law by agreement.67
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts elected to apply the
Massachusetts Arbitration Act, finding that "[t]he Massachusetts Act
applies here by... plain terms [of the Act]," although the court noted
that the FAA likely applied as well. 68 Notably, the court applied state
law even though the parties had not specified in the contract that
Massachusetts law would govern the agreement. 69  Additionally, the
court found that the parties may not force a contract to come under the
purview of the FAA by merely stating in the contract that the agreement
62. Id. at 287. The state statute invalidated an arbitration agreement unless the
following notice was printed:
UNDER TEXAS LAW, THIS AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND OF NO
LEGAL EFFECT UNLESS IT IS ALSO SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY OF
YOUR OWN CHOOSING. THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS A WAIVER
OF IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO A
JURY. YOU SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST
CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY.
Id.
63. See Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Mass 2007); Owens v. Nat'l Health
Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-RI I-CV, 2007 WL 3284669, at *4 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007).
64. Owens, 2007 WL 3284669, at *4.
65. Id. (noting that the terms of the contract state that the arbitration agreement is to
be governed by the "laws of the state where the Center is licensed," which was
Tennessee).
66. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989).
67. Owens, 2007 WL 3284669, at *4 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479); see also supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
68. Miller, 863 N.E.2d at 544. The court found the Massachusetts Act to be
companion legislation to the FAA and found nothing in United States Supreme Court
opinion or state statute that would cause the Massachusetts Act to be contrary to the
FAA. Id. at 543-44 (citing Mass St. 1960, ch. 374, § 1, codified, as amended, at GEN.
LAWS ch. 251).
69. Id. at 541 (stating that the arbitrator's decisions "shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the state or federal law applicable to a comparable civil
action").
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"affects interstate commerce," but that a finding of interstate commerce
required a constitutional inquiry.7 °
B. Validity ofArbitration Agreement
After determining the applicable law, the court must then find that a
valid contract exists using ordinary principles of contract law. 7' The
court focuses on several issues when determining validity: (1) the
authority of the signor; (2) procedural unconscionability; (3) substantive
72unconscionability; and (4) other legal arguments.
1. Authority of the Signor
The authority of the person signing the arbitration agreement is the
most troublesome issue in nursing home wrongful death claims.73 There
are currently two lines of disagreement among court opinions:
(1) whether the person signing the agreement has authority to act on the
patient's behalf and bind the patient to the arbitration agreement; and
(2) whether, in turn, the signature also binds third-party beneficiaries of
the wrongful death action.74 The second disagreement is unique to
wrongful death actions because of the derivative nature of the cause of
action.75
70. Id. at 544. The court found that the contract involved interstate commerce. Id.
However, the court found that just because the contract stated that it "evidences a
transaction involving interstate commerce governed by the Federal Arbitration Act," did
not artificially make it so. Id. at 540, 544 n.13.
71. See, e.g., Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 903 So. 2d 609, 612
(La. Ct. App. 2005) (listing the requirements for formation of a valid contract as
"capacity, consent, a certain object, and a lawful cause"); Trinity Mission of Clinton,
LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App.
August 28, 2007) (applying "ordinary principles of contract law" to determine the
validity of an arbitration provision), cert. granted, 977 So. 2d 1144 (Miss. 2008); see also
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text (reviewing each of the issues the
court analyzes to determine validity).
73. See infra notes 75-151 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
75. TEX. Cyv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Bangert
v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 881 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. App. 1994); Avila v. St. Luke's
Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 849-50 (Tex. App. 1997); Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App. 1992); Richardson v. Monts, 81 S.W.3d 889, 892-
893 (Tex. App. 2002); see also Stanley, supra note 21, at 630 (stating that a wrongful
death action is purely derivative and can only be brought if "the individual injured would
have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if the individual had lived").
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i. Attorney-in-Fact as Signor
Generally, if a person with legal authority to bind the plaintiff, such
as a durable power of attorney, signs a document containing an
arbitration clause, then the clause is enforceable using statutory analysis
to resolve questions of authority and capacity.76
In the recently appealed case, Owens v. National Health Corp., the
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the attorney-in-fact, who
possessed a durable power of attorney, was authorized to enter into a
binding arbitration agreement on behalf of the patient.77 The court found
that under Tennessee law, the nursing home contract was a "health care
decision" and under the scope of the authority of the attorney-in-fact.78
However, because the trial court denied the defendant's motion to
compel arbitration, the issue of whether the contract was unconscionable
was never fully explored.79 Thus, the court remanded the case to allow
the plaintiff time to conduct additional discovery on the issue of
unconscionability.
80
Similarly, in Miller v. Cotter,8' the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that an arbitration agreement was enforceable against
the son of the deceased patient when the son possessed a durable power
of attorney and a valid health care proxy for his father.82 The court also
found it significant that Miller had executed several admissions contracts
in the past for his ninety-one year old father and that his father was
incapacitated.
8 3
76. See Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 2004)
(finding that the nursing home agreement containing an arbitration clause signed by an
attorney-in-fact was binding on the estate of the deceased patient in a wrongful death
action); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding an arbitration clause binding in a wrongful death claim when the patient's
attorney-in-fact signed the admission agreement under a limited durable power of
attorney, which granted authority to "admit or release [the patient] from any hospital or
health care facility"); Hopkins, supra note 42, at 34 (noting, for example, that Florida
Statute § 744.441 specifically grants authority of the principal to enter into contracts).
77. Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-Ril-CV, 2007 WL
3284669, at *1, *7 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007). The power of attorney authorized the
attorneys-in-fact "to ASSIST [the patient] in making health care decisions ... if [the
patient is] incapacitated .. " Id. at * 1 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 31-11-105 (2001)).
78. Id. The court reasoned that "the decision to admit [the patient] to the nursing
home clearly constitutes a health care decision." Id. at *5 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-
6-201 (2)-(3) (2001)).
79. Id. at * 11 (finding that the trial court's decision that the attorney-in-fact lacked
requisite authority to bind the patient to arbitration pretermitted additional discovery of
whether the contract was unconscionable).
80. Id.
81. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass. 2007).
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id.
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ii. Personal Representative as Signor
Although the determination is less clear than when signed as an
attorney-in-fact, case law favors the enforceability of arbitration
agreements when signed by a personal representative. 84 While the term
"personal representative" holds little meaning in and of itself, the key
inquiry is whether the signatory possessed the requisite authority.
8 5
In MN MedInvest Company, L.P. v. Estate of Nichols ex rel.
Nichols,86 a mother who signed an admissions contract on behalf of her
minor child that contained an optional arbitration clause, sued the
nursing home for wrongful death, negligence, and breach of fiduciary
duty. 87 The court found that although public policy favors protection of
children from waiver of rights by their parents, an exception is made in
the procurement of medical care.88 The court held that under the doctrine
of necessities, the child was bound by the terms of the contract, including
the arbitration provision.89  The court also noted that the contract
provided for the mother to mark an "x" through the optional arbitration
clause if she did not want to be bound by its provisions, but that she did
not cross out the clause.90 Consequently, the court upheld the arbitration
agreement. 9'
In contrast, another court decided that a personal representative
lacked sufficient authority to bind a patient to arbitration.92 In Noland
Health Services, Inc. v. Wright,93 the Alabama Supreme Court held that
an arbitration clause was unenforceable in a wrongful death claim
brought by the administrator of a deceased patient's estate.94 The
patient's daughter-in-law signed the nursing home contract as a
"responsible party"; however, the daughter-in-law never had the power
of attorney and the administrator bringing the action never signed the
agreement.95
84. See Hopkins, supra note 42, at 34.
85. See id. (stating that "[i]f the signor has patent legal authority to bind the
plaintiff.., then statutory analysis typically resolves the question of capacity and
authority").
86. MN Medlnvest Co., L.P. v. Estate of Nichols ex rel. Nichols, 908 So. 2d 1178
(Fl. Ct. App. 2005).
87. Id. at 1179.
88. Id. (citing Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.




92. See Noland Health Servs, Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 690.
95. Id. at 685-87.
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iii. Health Care Proxy/Medical Power of Attorney as Signor
Often patients grant power to another individual to make "health
care decisions" on their behalf; but courts have struggled with what
constitutes a "health care decision. 96
In Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc.,97 an arbitration clause
in an admissions contract was not binding on a patient whose son signed
the contract as a statutory health care proxy.98 The court found that the
arbitration clause was not a "health care decision" for an incapacitated or
developmentally disabled patient who had no health care directive, as
proscribed by Florida Statute § 765.401 (2001). 9' Furthermore, the
statutory scheme did not grant the proxy the authority to sign any waiver
or release, such as waiving a jury trial, when making health care
decisions.100  Health care decisions for incapacitated persons were
defined by the state legislature as those relating to life-prolonging
procedures, application of medical benefits, access to medical records,
and anatomical gifts. 101 The court held that a proxy is not authorized to
waive the right to trial by jury or common law remedies.
10 2
Reaching a similar result in Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P. v.
Fryer,10 3 the court held that a daughter who possessed a "medical power
of attorney" to make health care decisions on behalf of the patient lacked
requisite authority to bind the patient to the arbitration agreement.
104
Two reasons led to the court's decision. First, under the language of the
Texas statute, the medical power of attorney is not effective until a
doctor certifies that the patient is unable to make medical decisions on
his or her own. 105 The court found no certification or evidence of
incompetence. 0 6 Second, a medical power of attorney grants authority
to another to make health care decisions, which are defined in a Texas
statute as "consent, refusal to consent, or withdrawal of consent to health
care, treatment, service, or a procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an
individual's physical or mental condition."' 0 7  The court specifically
96. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
97. Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
98. Id. at 301.
99. Id. at 300.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 765.101(5) (2001)).
102. Id. at 301.
103. Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App. 2007).
104. Id. at 353.
105. Id. at 352 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.152(b) (Vernon 2007)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.002(7) (Vernon 2007)).
[Vol. 113:2
2008] WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS FOR NURSING HOME PATIENTS 543
found that waiving a legal right to a jury trial was not a "health care
decision" as intended under the statutory definition. 1
08
iv. Statutory or Surrogate Signor
Some states allow family members to sign the admissions contract
for the patient. 10 9 A determination of whether the signature of a family
member not acting with legal authority is binding hinges on whether the
patient lacks capacity to sign." 0 If the patient is determined by the court
to be incapacitated, the court may in turn find that a relative who signs
on the patient's behalf as a surrogate binds the patient to the arbitration
agreement. 111
In Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 12 the court
upheld an arbitration agreement signed by the patient's daughter.'13 The
Supreme Court of Mississippi reasoned that because the patient lacked
capacity to sign the nursing home agreement and because her daughter
was in the statutory class of members that could act as a surrogate for her
mother, the arbitration agreement was binding on the daughter as
plaintiff in the wrongful death action. 14 The Court did not reach its
finding of patient incapacity pursuant to a declaration of incapacity by
108. Id. at 352-53; see also Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-R11-
CV, 2007 WL 3284669, at *5 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007) (defining health care decisions in
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-201(2) (2001) as "any care, treatment, service or procedure to
maintain, diagnose or treat an individual's physical or mental condition, and includes
medical care....").
109. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 114, 117-118 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
112. Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss.
2007).
113. Id. at 742.
114. Id. at 736-37. The relevant Mississippi surrogate statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult or
emancipated minor if the patient has been determined by the primary physician
to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the agent or
guardian is not reasonably available.
(2) An adult or emancipated minor may designate any individual to act as
surrogate by personally informing the supervising health-care provider. In the
absence of a designation, or if the designee is not reasonably available, any
member of the following classes of the patient's family who is reasonably
available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate:
(a) The Spouse, unless legally separated;
(b) An adult child;
(c) A parent; or
(d) An adult brother or sister.
(7) A health-care decision made by a surrogate for a patient is effective without
judicial approval.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211 (West 2005).
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the patient's primary physician, but rather relied on the hospital
physician who reported that the patient "did not have the mental capacity
to manage her affairs."' 5
The reasoning in Brown was recently upheld in Gulledge v. Trinity
Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs, L.L.C.116 when the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi reached a
similar conclusion that a finding of patient incapacity plus the signature
of a daughter surrogate on the admissions contract were sufficient to
enforce arbitration.1 7 In Gulledge, the court interpreted the decision in
Brown to mean that "requiring an express admission of incapacity by a
party" was not necessary to find incapacity.1 8 Thus, the fact that the
admitting physician found the patient to be "confused" and diagnosed her
with "advanced dementia," as well as nursing home reports of her
condition, were sufficient to find incapacity.' 
19
By contrast, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
held that surrogates lack authority to bind patients to arbitration
provisions. 2° The court held that statutes authorizing the "next of kin"
to make certain healthcare decisions for incompetent patients did not
bind patients or signatories to arbitration provisions because the
legislature granted authority to family members to make only health
decisions, not arbitration decisions.' 1
v. Agent as Signor
Courts generally hold that absent actual or apparent authority from
the patient, a signatory is not an agent of the patient and thus not bound
115, Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P., 949 So. 2d at 736-37 (noting that the
court made specific multiple references to the plaintiffs own admission of incapacity).
Cf Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL
2421720, at *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) (holding that the signature of the patient's
son on the admissions agreement was ineffective to bind the son when there was no
finding of patient incapacity).
116. Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs, LLC, No.
3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007).
117. Id.at*2.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *2-3 (reporting that the plaintiff admitted that nursing home records
showed that the patient was "unable to recall her date of birth, [the] current season, nor
the three words that was [sic] given to her (pen, mill, apple), nor the fact that she is in the
[nursing] facility").
120. Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC, 148 Cal. App. 4th 581, 590-91 (Cal.
App. 4th Dist. 2007) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1418.8, subd. (c), 1599.3
(2007)).
121. Id. (noting that the court found the omission of authority to make arbitration
decisions in the statutory language to be significant).
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by terms of the arbitration agreement, even if the signatory is the
patient's spouse. 122
For example, in Sikes v. Heritage Oaks West Retirement Village,
23
the wife of the patient signed admissions documents as "power of
attorney/guardian" for her husband. 124 However, she had not been given
power of attorney nor was she appointed as her husband's guardian.'25
Moreover, the patient was not incapacitated upon admission to the
nursing home and displayed no affirmative actions to convey apparent
authority to his wife to sign the admissions agreement. 26 Thus, the court
determined that the arbitration agreement was invalid and unenforceable
against the wife in her individual capacity. 1
27
In California, an arbitration clause was held non-binding in a
nursing home contract that was signed by the daughters of a comatose
patient. 28 The court found that the daughters had no authority to enter
into an arbitration contract for their mother because they were not her
agents. 29 The court specifically noted that, "[a] person cannot become
the agent of another merely by representing herself as such," as the
hospital claimed the daughters did by signing the agreement.130 Instead,
to be an agent, a person must be intentionally employed by the
principal.'13  The nursing home produced no evidence of the mother
employing the daughters as her agents; consequently, the court denied
the motion to compel arbitration.
32
Other courts reach similar conclusions when there is no evidence to
suggest that the patient held the signatory out as his or her agent, took
122. See infra notes 124-39 and accompanying text.
123. Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App. 2007).
124. Id. at 810.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 809-10 (noting that the court found no evidence of the husband taking
action to induce a belief that his wife was his agent).
127. Id. The nursing home argued that the wife was estopped from denying the
validity of her signature. Id. at 810. However, the court rejected the argument, finding
that estoppel is only valid when the plaintiff seeks to "derive a direct benefit from the
contract containing the arbitration provision." Id. (quoting In re Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005)). The court found the estoppel theory
inapplicable because the wrongful death claim arose from common law remedies, and
was not specific to the contract provisions. Id. at 809-10.
128. Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 896 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
129. Id. at 894.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 896.
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specific actions to induce a belief that the signatory possessed agency
authority, or was even present when the agreement was signed.
1 33
Under a passive definition of apparent authority, however, the
Supreme Court of Alabama recently held that a deceased patient's
brother possessed apparent authority under agency theory, which
justified binding him to the arbitration provision. 34 The brother signed
the arbitration agreement as "authorized representative," and his sister
granted him durable power of attorney several weeks after signing the
admissions agreement. 35 The court used an apparent authority theory to




In wrongful death actions, courts are split as to whether third-party
beneficiaries are bound by arbitration agreements, a significant issue in
nursing home wrongful death claims. 
37
In Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber,38 a son brought a
wrongful death action on behalf of himself and other beneficiaries of his
deceased mother.' 39  The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that,
although the son's signature on the admissions documents was not
binding because he acted as neither her agent nor her surrogate, the third-
133. See, e.g., Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Tex. App.
2007) (finding the husband did not hold his wife out as his agent when she signed the
admissions agreement); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-
COA, 2007 WL 2421720, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) (noting that it must be the
principal that holds the agent out as having authority, not the agent himself and that the
nursing home bears the burden of establishing the agency relationship); Ashburn Health
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 648 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. App. Ct. 2007) (fiding that the nursing
home had not met its burden of showing that the patient had authorized her husband to
act as her agent when he signed the admissions contract, particularly when her son did
have power of attorney although he did not sign); Texas Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v.
Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 353-54 (Tex. App. 2007) (noting that what matters is the actions
of the principal, not the agent, and that the principal was not even present when her
daughter signed the admissions agreement).
134. Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Ala., Inc., 978 So. 2d 27, 30-31 (Ala. 2007).
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id. at 30. Focusing less on the actions of the principal, the court found that
apparent authority "is implied where the principal passively permits the agent to appear
to a third person to have the authority to act on [her] behalf." Id. (quoting Treadwell
Ford, Inc. v. Courtesy Auto Brokers, Inc., 426 So.2d 859, 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)).
The admissions contract itself defined an "authorized representative" as "a person duly
authorized by the Resident," and therefore the court was more willing to find that the
brother signed with the patient's authority. Id. at 31.
137. See infra notes 139-149 and accompanying text.
138. Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL
2421720 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007).
139. Id. at*l.
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party beneficiaries were still bound by the arbitration provision. 40 To
reach its conclusion, the court first reasoned that, because the patient
clearly received benefit from the contract in the form of care, room, and
board, she was bound by the agreement, even though she did not sign
it.141  Second, the court found that if the patient was bound by the
contract as a third-party beneficiary herself, her beneficiaries were bound
as well because they "stand in her shoes" in a wrongful death action.
142
Thus, the court concluded that the arbitration provision was binding on
the third-party beneficiaries. 
143
In addition, a provision in an arbitration agreement that specifically
stated that "this [a]greement ... shall not be revoked by the death of any
Party hereto including the Resident. Said provisions shall be binding on
the estate of the Resident," was upheld in Covenant Health Rehab of
Picayune, L.P. v. Brown. 14 4 The court relied on a previous holding to
find that "arbitration agreements, specifically, are not invalidated by the
death of the signatory and may be binding on successors and heirs if
provided in the agreement."' 145 Interpreting the "estate of the Resident"
to include heirs, the court determined that the beneficiaries were held to
the arbitration provision.1
46
However, recently a Texas court held that the plaintiffs wife was
not bound by an arbitration agreement in a wrongful death action when
she specifically declined to sign the nursing home admissions contract in
her individual capacity, although she signed it as the legal representative
of the patient. 147  The court asserted that a wrongful death claim is
personal to the statutory beneficiaries asserting the claims, and thus
recovery did not benefit the estate of the former patient, but rather the
wife in her individual capacity. 148 Consequently, the wife was not bound
by the arbitration provision.
49
vii. Separate Signature on the Arbitration Agreement
In Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, LLC v. Lewis, 5' the court
found that a conservator's signature at the end of a nursing home
140. Id. at *5-6.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *6.
143. Id.
144. Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 738 (Miss.
2007) (plurality opinion).
145. Id. (citing Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 118 (Miss. 2006)).
146. Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P., 949 So. 2d at 742.
147. In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 294 (Tex. App. 2005).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Bedford Care Ctr.-Monroe Hall, LLC v. Lewis, 923 So. 2d 998 (Miss. 2006).
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agreement did not bind the plaintiff conservator to arbitration in a
negligence and gross negligence action against the nursing home of the
patient. 51 The court found that the conservator's failure to initial or sign
next to the arbitration provision as requested was a manifestation of her
intent not to be bound by its terms; however, the conservator did sign at
the end of the document below text reading "the undersigned
acknowledge that each of them has read and understood this agreement,
including the arbitration provision and has received a copy of this
agreement, and that each of them voluntarily consents to and accepts all
of its terms." 152 Despite signing at the end of the document, the court
held that the conservator was not bound to the arbitration agreement due
to her lack of signature by the arbitration provision itself. 
153
2. Unconscionability
Prior to enforcing an arbitration provision, the court must also
determine if the clause is unconscionable, and thus invalid.
154
Unconscionability is determined at the time of making the agreement and
is marked by unfair terms that are oppressive to a disadvantaged party,
taking into account the setting, purpose and effect of the particular
agreement. 155 Generally, to be unconscionable, the arbitration agreement
must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 
156
Alternatively, some jurisdictions use a sliding scale test to find
unconscionability in the aggregate.1 57 For example, in Romano v. Manor
Care, Inc.,58 the court found that "the more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable and
151. Id. at 1002.
152. Id. at 1000-01.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
155. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007).
156. See Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007
WL 2421720, at *7 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007). The court defined unconscionability
as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties, together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Id. (citing Entergy
Miss., Inc. v. Burdett Gin Co., 726 So. 2d 1202, 1207 para.1 1 (Miss. 1998)); see also
Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curium).
157. See, e.g., Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (finding an arbitration provision unconscionable "[b]ecause the arbitration contract
in this case is substantively unconscionable to a great degree, and we conclude that there
is some irregularity in the contract formation amounting to procedural unconscionability
of some degree . .
158. Id.
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vice versa." 159  The party bringing the affirmative defense of
unconscionability bears the burden of proof.
160
i. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the circumstances
surrounding formation of the contract and is defined as an absence of
meaningful choice by one of the parties.' 61 Factors the court uses to
determine procedural unconscionability include lack of knowledge of the
arbitration provisions, lack of voluntariness, inconspicuous print,
complex language, disparity in bargaining power, lack of opportunity to
review the contract or ask questions about its terms, offering the contract
on a "take it or leave it" basis, unreasonable terms using an ordinary
person standard, and the nature of the health care services.
162
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently concluded that the
arbitration agreement at issue between a patient and doctor was not
procedurally unconscionable because it was a stand-alone contract, had
an attached explanation of its purpose that encouraged the patient to ask
questions, contained "ten-point capital letter red type, directly above the
signature line, that [read] 'by signing this contract you are giving up your
right to a jury or court trial' on any medical malpractice claim," and
provided for revocation by the patient within thirty days. 163
Other courts have come to a similar conclusion. The Mississippi
Supreme Court found an arbitration clause was not procedurally
unconscionable when it was on the last page of a six-page agreement,
was clearly marked in bold-faced type and capital letters, and was
designed to draw attention to text indicating that signing the agreement
was voluntary. 164  Although the court found the agreement to be a
contract of adhesion (since the patient and his signatory daughter were a
weaker party with little choice in the matter), it did not find evidence of
procedural unconscionability given that the plaintiffs were "two
competent individuals signing a well-marked, highly visible agreement
159. Id. at 62.
160. Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Alabama, Inc., 978 So. 2d 27, 31-32 (Ala. 2007).
161. See, e.g., Romano, 861 So. 2d at 62; Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911
So. 2d 507, 517 (Miss. 2005).
162. See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320-21 (Tenn. 1996); Trinity
Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007 WL 2421720, at *7
(Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007); see also Gainsville Health Care Ctr. v. Weston, 857 So.
2d 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
163. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 321.
164. Vicksburg Partners, L.P., 911 So. 2d at 520.
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which indicated very clearly that dispute resolution would be
accomplished by way of arbitration."
165
The Massachusetts Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion
when it held that an arbitration agreement executed by an adult son on
behalf of his father was not procedurally unconscionable when the son
was an intelligent man who had executed similar agreements in the past,
was given thirty days to rescind the arbitration provision, the arbitration
agreement appeared on a separate form, and acceptance of the agreement
was not a condition of admission.1
66
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama did not find
unconscionability when the arbitration agreement conspicuously read,
"NOT A CONDITION OF ADMISSION-READ CAREFULLY,"
advised the resident to seek legal counsel, was not a condition for
admission, and stated that the agreement "may be rescinded by written
notice to the Facility from the Resident within thirty days of
signature."167
Reaching a contrary result, a Tennessee circuit court refused to
enforce arbitration based on procedural unconscionability when a
husband signed an agreement on behalf of his wife. 168  The court
invalidated the arbitration provision after finding that the husband was
illiterate, the admissions contract was presented on a "take it or leave it"
basis without adequate explanation of the arbitration provision, the
provision was buried on the tenth page of an eleven-page document, and
the wife was in great need of medical care.
169
Also, on remand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
summary judgment for the plaintiff in a wrongful death claim based on
whether the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable.
170
The court determined that material facts existed as to whether an
165. Id. at 520; see also Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P v. Brown, 949 So.
2d 732, 737 (Miss. 2007) (reaching the same conclusion with identical contract headings
and length).
166. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007).
167. Carraway v. Beverly Enterprises Alabama, Inc., 978 So. 2d 27, 29, 32 (Ala.
2007). Alabama's test for unconscionability does not specifically break out procedural
and substantive unconscionability, but rather it determines "whether there are (1) terms
that are grossly favorable to a party that has (2) overwhelming bargaining power." Id. at
32. The particular factors reviewed by the court, however, fit in the procedural
unconscionability category applied by other courts. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
168. Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 732 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2003).
169. Id. at 734-35.
170. Beverly Enters.-Miss. Inc. v. Powell, 244 F. App'x 577, 579 (5th Cir. 2007)
(noting that federal decisions regarding nursing home issues are rare, but will likely
increase in the future).
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illiterate man received proper explanation of the arbitration agreement
and whether he signed the agreement with an "X.
171
ii. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability is defined as contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to one of the parties. 172  The court decides
substantive unconscionability by looking at specific terms of the
agreement that may represent oppression or gross disparity between the
parties. 173 A term which significantly alters the legal rights or remedies
available to one of the parties may be per se unconscionable.
1 74
If substantive unconscionability is found, the court will first attempt
to strike the unconscionable term(s) and uphold the remainder of the
arbitration agreement.1 75  If, however, the unconscionable term is so
intertwined with the arbitration agreement that it cannot be severed, a
court may invalidate the entire arbitration agreement. 176
In Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, the court found the
following terms in the arbitration agreement unconscionable:
(1) allowing the nursing home to sue in court for disputes regarding
payment but requiring disputes on any other grounds to be arbitrated;
(2) limiting damages; (3) waiving punitive damages; and (4) charging a
fee of three dollars per page when requesting medical records, which was
higher than the statutorily-determined amount.1 77  The mandatory
arbitration provision, the main issue on appeal, however, was upheld.
1 78
171. Id. (discussing that one of the main issues in the dispute was whether the "X"
was the decedent's signature and that the only witnesses to the signature were nursing
home employees).
172. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Powertel v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Pridgen v. Green
Tree Fin. Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 655, 657-58 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
173. See E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 714 (Miss. 2002); Covenant Health
Rehab of Picayune, L.P v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 737 (Miss. 2007) (analyzing
provisions for substantive unconscionability by looking at the four comers of the
agreement).
174. Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P, 949 So. 2d at 737.
175. See Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, No. 2005-CA-02199-COA, 2007
WL 2421720, at *9 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) (citing Covenant Health Rehab of
Picayune, L.P, 949 So. 2d 732 at 741).
176. See Place at Vero Beach, Inc., 953 So. 2d at 775-76 (stating that offending
sentences cannot be severed if they are interdependent with the remaining clauses and
would cause the court to rewrite the agreement).
177. Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC, 2007 WL 2421720, at *10-11.
178. Id. The court relied on the holding in Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P.
v. Brown since the identical provision was upheld in that case. Id. The provision read in
pertinent part:
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Instead of invalidating the entire arbitration agreement, the court severed
the unconscionable portions and held the remainder of the agreement
valid.'79
Likewise, in Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown,
the court severed substantively unconscionable provisions and upheld the
remainder of the arbitration agreement. 180  The court struck provisions
that limited liability,' 81 waived punitive damages, 82 forfeited all claims
except for those involving willful acts,' 83 allowed the nursing facility to
bring suit on issues of payment but prohibited the resident from suing on
all grounds, 184 required the party challenging the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement or award to pay all costs,' 85 and imposed a one-
year time limit on legal action.
186
An example of another arbitration clause that a court completely
invalidated because of substantive unconscionability is one that granted a
unilateral right for the nursing home to reject the decision of an arbitrator
The Resident and Responsible Party agree that any and all claims, disputes
and/or controversies between them, and the Facility... shall be resolved by
binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association and
its rules and procedures .... All Parties hereto agree to arbitration for their
individual respective anticipated benefit of reduced costs of pursuing a timely
resolution of a claim, dispute or controversy, should one arise. The Parties
agree to share equally the costs of such arbitration regardless of the outcome.
Consistent with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Parties agree
that the Arbitrator(s) may not award punitive damages and actual damages
awarded, if any, shall be awarded pursuant to Section E.7.
Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P, 949 So. 2d at 740. The court struck the last
sentence of the provision relating to damages but upheld the arbitration agreement as
modified. Id. at 741.
179. Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC, 2007 WL 2421720, at * 11 (upholding the
arbitration agreement after severing the last sentence of the mandatory arbitration
provision and all other unconscionable terms).
180. Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P, 949 So. 2d at 741-42.
181. Id. at 739 (quoting Section E7 limiting damages as: "Should any claim, dispute
or controversy arise between the Parties ... the settlement thereof shall be for actual
damages not exceed the lesser of a) $50,000 or b) the number of days that the Resident
was in the Facility multiplied times the daily rate applicable for said Resident .... ).
182. Id. (listing Section C8: "The Parties hereto agree to waive punitive damages
against each other and agree not to seek punitive damages under any circumstances.").
183. Id. (stating Section C5 as: "The Resident and Responsible Party further agree to
indemnify and hold harmless the Facility from and against claims... unless such
claim ... is the result of the Facility's willful conduct.").
184. Id. (quoting Section E5 as: "In the event a claim.., shall arise between the
Parties other than regarding matters concerning the payment for services rendered or
refunds due, the Parties agree to participate in a grievance resolution process.").
185. Id. (stating Section E12: "In the event a Party fails to proceed with mediation
and/or arbitration, challenges to the arbitrator's award.., the other Party is entitled to all
costs of suit or action including reasonable attorney fees .... ").
186. Id. Section E 16 of the arbitration agreement prohibited legal action "more than
one year following the happening of the event giving rise to [the] complaint." Id. The
court held that the facility could not alter the statute of limitations. Id. at 740.
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without cause, required a second arbitration before a panel of three
physicians, and required the patient to pay one-half the costs of both
arbitrations.'
87
3. Void as Against Public Policy
The court may invalidate an otherwise valid contract if "its
provisions deprive the plaintiff of the ability to obtain meaningful relief
for alleged statutory violations. ' 88 Courts have generally rejected the
argument that an arbitration agreement in a nursing home contract is per
se void as against public policy, often citing that arbitration does not take
away any rights the parties may have, but simply represents an
agreement to move the dispute to a different forum.
1 89
However, Florida courts provide an example of when an arbitration
agreement is void as against public policy. 190 The nursing home contract
in Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc. required that disputes be
resolved by arbitration before the National Health Lawyers Association
("NHLA").191 The rules of the NHLA state that the arbitrator may not
award damages absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence that
the alleged offending party is guilty of the misconduct.1 92 The court
ruled that the clear and convincing evidence standard was contrary to
Florida's Nursing Home Rights Act ("NHRA"), § 400.023(2)(a)-(d)
(2001), which required a preponderance of the evidence burden of
proof.1 93 In addition, the court found that § 400.023(1) of the NHRA was
a remedial statute that allowed for an action to be brought "in any court
of competent jurisdiction to enforce such rights and to recover actual and
punitive damages for any violation of the rights of a resident or for
negligence." ' 94 Because the rules of the NHLA effectively limited, if not
187. Beynon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
188. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 578
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curium).
189. See Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs, LLC, No.
3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007); Owens v. Nat'l
Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-RI I-CV, 2007 WL 3284669, at *8 (Tenn. Nov. 8,
2007) (citing Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tenn. 1996)).
190. See Fletcher v. Huntington Place L.P., 952 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773, 775-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007); SA-PG-Ocala, LLC v. Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006);
Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
191. Blankfeld, 902 So. 2d at 297.
192. Id. at 298.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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eliminated, some of the remedies provided by the statute, the court held
the arbitration clause void as against public policy.
195
The same court invalidated a similar arbitration agreement two
years later in Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson.196  Likewise, the
Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that an arbitration
agreement that required clear and convincing evidence of intentional
misconduct in order to recover certain kinds of damages "substantially
limited the patient's remedies under the Nursing Home Resident's Act,"
and was void as against public policy.'
97
Similar to unconscionable provisions, provisions that violate public
policy may be severed from the agreement and the remainder of the
agreement enforced.198 Thus, in Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of
Linton ex rel. Graham,'99 while the clause that capped non-economic
damages at $250,000 and completely waived all punitive damages was
declared void as against public policy, the remainder of the arbitration
agreement was upheld.2 °°
4. "Other Consideration" Argument
Some plaintiffs have argued that an arbitration clause in a nursing
home agreement is not binding because it violates federal Medicare
and/or Medicaid law, which prohibits additional fees or "other
195. Id.
196. Place at Vero Beach, Inc. v. Hanson, 953 So. 2d 773, 775-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007). The arbitration agreement specified that disputes would be arbitrated by the
American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA), which required a clear and convincing
evidence standard, while Florida's NHRA requires a more favorable standard of proof for
the plaintiff-preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 774. The court rejected the nursing
home's argument that by specifying that the agreement shall be governed by the "laws of
Florida," the parties agreed that AHLA rules were superseded by Florida law; the court
found no evidence of such an agreement. Id. at 775. Because the arbitration agreement
was in conflict with Florida state law and the agreement was "built around" the AHLA
provision, the offending provision could not be severed and the entire agreement was
unenforceable. Id. at 775-76.
197. SA-PG-Ocala, LLC v. Stokes, 935 So. 2d 1242, 1242-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006); see also Fletcher v. Huntington Place L.P., 952 So. 2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007) (relying on the ruling in SA-PG-Ocala, LLC v. Stokes to reach a similar
holding).
198. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
199. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curium).
200. Id. at 578-79. The pertinent provisions read, "[n]oneconomic damages, such as
pain and suffering, shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000" and "[p]unitive damages
shall not be awarded." Id. at 580 (Barfield & Padovano, JJ., concurring). In the case, the
estate of an elderly female patient with advanced Alzheimer's brought suit alleging
negligence and other statutory violations when she died after being beaten and raped at
the nursing facility. Id. at 576.
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consideration" as a precondition of admitting a person to a nursing home
facility.
201
Courts that have faced this argument have found that an agreement
to arbitrate is not "other consideration" as contemplated by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r(c)(5)(A)(iii), which refers only to consideration similar to gifts
or money.20 2  In reaching its conclusion, one court found that the
arbitration agreement simply sets a forum for future disputes and that, if
the court agreed with the argument, "virtually any contract term" a
plaintiff decided he or she did not like could be construed as "other
consideration."
20 3
While an arbitration agreement is not "other consideration" in
violation of the federal statute, the agreement represents sufficient
204consideration under contract principles to form a binding contract.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that a "reciprocal
exchange of benefit and detriment," in that each party "waived its right
to judicial process and gained the right to invoke arbitration," was
adequate consideration to form a binding contract.20 5
5. Contract of Adhesion
Courts have routinely held that contracts of adhesion made on a
"take-it or leave-it" basis are not per se unconscionable. 206 More than
201. "[A] nursing facility must.., not charge solicit, accept, or receive, in addition to
any amount otherwise required to be paid under the State plan..., any gift, money,
donation, or other consideration as a precondition of admitting ... the individual to the
facility .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(iii) (2007) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-R1 1-CV, 2007 WL
3284669, at *8-9 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(iii) (2005), as
applied to nursing facilities, and 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3) (2005), as applied to a person
eligible for Medicaid); see also Hopkins, supra note 42, at 40.
202. See, e.g., Gulledge v. Trinity Mission Health & Rehab of Holly Springs, LLC,
No. 3:07CV008-M-A, 2007 WL 3102141, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 22, 2007); Owens v.
Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 989 (Ala. 2004); Gainsville Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Broughsville v.
OHECC, LLC, No. 05CA008672, 2005 WL 3483777, at *7-8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21,
2005); Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 418-19 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004).
203. Owens, 890 So. 2d at 989.
204. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 547 n.16 (Mass. 2007).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732,
737 (Miss. 2007) ("There is nothing per se unconscionable about arbitration agreements."
(quoting Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 518 (Miss. 2005)));
Gulledge, 2007 WL 3102141, at *3 ("[A] contract of adhesion.., only become[s]
procedurally unconscionable where the stronger party's terms are unnegotiable and the
weaker party is prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all."
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adhesion, such as unconscionability or offending public policy, must be
present to invalidate a contract.2 °7
In conclusion, determining the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in nursing home admissions contracts is complex. Multiple
issues such as the applicability of state or federal law, the authority of the
person signing the admissions agreement, and the potential procedural,
and substantive unconscionability of the arbitration provisions combine
to make consistent court holdings difficult. As a result, patients,
families, and nursing homes lack the clarity necessary to knowingly enter
into arbitration agreements.
IV. ANALYSIS: CLARIFYING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
ADMISSIONS CONTRACTS
Arbitrating wrongful death claims in the nursing home setting is a
hot-button issue winding its way through the state and, most recently, the
federal court systems.20 8 The nursing home industry, courts, and
legislatures must work together to bring necessary clarity.
First, this article briefly discusses the court's willingness to apply
state law instead of the FAA, in light of the court's history of near carte
blanche approval of arbitration agreements. 20 9 Second, it argues that the
artificiality of the signature on the nursing home admissions contract is
rife with confusion and that it must be clarified for resident and nursing
home alike.210  Current conflicting holdings stand in the way of
precedence in nursing home jurisprudence. Third, the article suggests
that, although court opinions vary, recent holdings of unconscionability
in nursing home arbitration agreements provide sufficient guidance for
nursing homes to adjust their admissions contracts and procedures to
avoid unconscionable terms. 211 Fourth, in addition to unconscionability,
the article analyzes the validity of other arguments against enforcement
such as void as against public policy, other consideration, and waiver.
212
(quoting Vicksburg Partners, L.P., 911 So. 2d at 518) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
207. See Miller, 863 N.E.2d at 547 n.16 ("[C]ontracts [of adhesion] are enforceable
unless they are unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the
particular circumstances." (second alteration in original) (quoting Chase Commercial
Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992))); see also supra note 165
and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 8-10, 31-39 and accompanying text (noting the increase of
litigation involving mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home wrongful death
actions since 2005 and the various cases in state and federal courts, most in 2007).
209. See infra notes 213-233 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 238-281 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 283-311 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 305-316 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the article recommends change. It proposes drawing the line at
excluding wrongful death claims from arbitration agreements, or, at the
very least, modifying arbitration provisions and procedures in a
meaningful way.
A. Applicable Law
What once was a perfunctory finding that the FAA governed the
interpretation of arbitration agreements appears to be challenged in
current nursing home arbitration cases.21 3 Several cracks in the analysis
of whether the FAA applies deserve the court's attention. If the FAA
does not apply, courts are significantly more empowered to invalidate
arbitration agreements under state, federal, or common law principles.21 4
For the FAA to apply, the contract in question must "involve
interstate commerce., 21 5 Mississippi has perhaps the most experience of
216
any jurisdiction in interpreting nursing home arbitration agreements.
In Vicksburg Partners, the Supreme Court of Mississippi set a clear
precedent, finding that nursing home arbitration agreements do involve
interstate commerce, primarily because of the patient's use of Medicare
funds to cover the costs of care.217
Notwithstanding the holding in Vicksburg Partners, some recent
court opinions suggest that the FAA may not apply.21 8 First, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma has specifically rejected Mississippi's
reasoning that such agreements "involve interstate commerce" when they
21
are applied to a purely local transaction. 2 19 Instead, the court found that
Congress provides Medicaid financial assistance to states that comply
with federal regulations and, as such, Congress is exercising its spending
power and not its commerce power.220 This distinction re-characterizes
the source of power to more accurately reflect the purpose of the
programs previously relied upon to find involvement in interstate
213. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (illustrating the favorable history
towards arbitration); supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text (summarizing three cases
that have applied state law to the agreement).
214. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
216. See case cited supra note 48 and accompanying text (referring to Vicksburg
Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005)).
217. See case cited supra note 48 and accompanying text (highlighting that the
Mississippi cases serve as representative examples of similar findings).
218. See cases cited supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text (citing Bruner v.
Timberlane Manor, L.P., 155 P.3d 16 (Okla. 2006); In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279 (Tex.
App. 2005); Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass 2007); and Owens v. Nat'l Health
Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-RI 1-CV, 2007 WL 3284669 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007)).
219. See case cited supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Bruner decision).
220. See case cited supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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commerce. 22 1 In turn, the various regulations imposed on states who
want to receive Medicaid funding are under the umbrella of "health and
safety" regulations of the SSA, which are silent as to a connection of the
various programs to interstate commerce.222 Given the holding in
Bruner, a determination of whether a nursing home arbitration agreement
involves interstate commerce is at least up to more debate than
previously given by the courts.223
Second, even if nursing home arbitration agreements affect
interstate commerce in the aggregate, the FAA may still be preempted by
conflicting federal law.224 For example, the federal Social Security Act
governs regulations of state Medicaid programs.225 The SSA specifically
conveys a right of judicial review, as permitted by state law.226
Therefore, a federal regulation may preclude the applicability of the FAA
if the federal regulation permits state law to legislate judicial review, as
held in Bruner.
227
The principle that a conflicting federal law may preempt the FAA is
also illustrated in In re Kepka.228 The federal McCarran-Ferguson Act
allows states to regulate the business of insurance and was found by the
court to apply to healthcare contracts aimed at protecting the relationship
between the insurer and the insured as required under the Act.229
Because the MFA preempted the FAA, the state statute regulating notice
requirements of arbitration agreements was enforceable.23 0  Both
examples, at the very least, illustrate a split of court opinion as to the
applicability, in the presence of conflicting federal law, of the FAA to
terms of certain nursing home arbitration agreements.
Third, even assuming the FAA applies, the FAA does not preclude
application of state law or terms of the parties that further the scope of
arbitration. 231 For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
221. See case cited supra notes 48, 53 and accompanying text (highlighting a shift in
reasoning).
222. See case cited supra note 53 and accompanying text.
223. See case cited supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
224. See case cited supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting the court's
reasoning for determining that the FAA did not apply).
225. See case cited supra note 51 and accompanying text.
226. See case cited supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
227. See case cited supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
228. See case cited supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (citing In re Kepka, 178
S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App. 2005); Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537 (Mass 2007)).
229. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that the court characterized the
nursing home contract as involving medical insurance).
230. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
231. See cases cited supra notes 28-29, 67 and accompanying text (noting the
findings of the Supreme Court that did not preclude states from broadening the scope of
the FAA).
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held that the Massachusetts Arbitration Act applied to the party's
arbitration agreement.232 Although the court noted that the FAA applied
as well, it found that Congress never intended the FAA to preempt all
state arbitration law.233 Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
Tennessee as the choice of law in a nursing home agreement, rather than
holding that the FAA applied.234
While it is too early to determine if other courts will follow the
reasoning in the four cases mentioned above, the decisions highlight the
fact that controversy exists as to the applicable law when interpreting
arbitration agreements. Consequently, in order to inform future
decisions, greater emphasis should be placed in court opinion on the
reasons why the FAA, other federal law, or state law applies.
B. Validity ofArbitration Agreement Issues
Several obstacles exist for determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement in a nursing home admissions contract. 235 The three biggest
areas of confusion among the courts are the authority of the signatory,
procedural unconscionability, and substantive unconscionability.236
1. Signature Issues
Signature problems plague both plaintiffs and nursing homes
alike.237 Courts are significantly divided as to which signors have
authority to bind a party to arbitration in a wrongful death claim.238 The
current titles for signatories run the gamut from "authorized
representative," "personal representative," "responsible party," or other
label. 239  However, the title on the signature is largely artificial
considering what seems to matter most to the courts is whether the
patient lacks capacity to sign or authorize another to sign and whether the
signor actually possesses the requisite authority.4
232. See cases cited supra note 63 and accompanying text.
233. See cases cited supra notes 28-29, 63 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (highlighting the decision in
Owens).
235. See supra notes 71-207 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 71-187 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 71-152 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 76-152 and accompanying text (summarizing difficulties in
interpretation of signors in various capacities).
239. See supra notes 71-152 and accompanying text.
240. See cases cited supra notes 92-95, 123-127 and accompanying text (illustrating
Noland Health Servs, Inc. v. Wright, 971 So. 2d 681 (Ala. 2007) and Sikes v. Heritage
Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App. 2007), in which the plaintiff signed as
"personal representative" or other title, but lacked legal authority to bind the patient to an
arbitration agreement).
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i. Attorney-in-Fact
Generally, a signor who possesses durable power of attorney has
authority to bind the patient to an arbitration agreement; however, courts
have held otherwise in certain situations.241 Miller represents the
majority opinion that an individual with durable power of attorney has
authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the patient, and thus can
bind the patient to an arbitration agreement.242
However, two grounds exist for questioning the authority of a
durable power of attorney. First, under many durable powers of attorney,
the patient must be deemed by the court to be incompetent for the
authority to be conveyed.243 Frequently, an official determination of
capacity has not been made before invoking the power of attorney, and
questions of capacity are not easily resolved by the court.244
Second, the specific language of the durable power of attorney may
reference the ability to make "health care decisions" as opposed to
general contract authority. 245 This concern is also evident when the
person signing the agreement is a health care proxy, medical power of
attorney, or other statutory surrogate.246 Whether a predispute mandatory
arbitration agreement is a "health care" decision is still up for debate in
the court system. 247 Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's decision in Owens to find that a nursing home contract was
a "health care" decision and under the purview of a durable power of
241. See supra note 76-83 and accompanying text (summarizing case law interpreting
the authority of a durable power of attorney).
242. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
243. See cases cited supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (noting that a
durable medical power of attorney requires a finding of incapacity); see also supra notes
82-83 and accompanying text (suggesting that because the father was deemed to be
incapacitated, the durable power of attorney held by the son was given more effect).
244. See cases cited supra notes 115, 117-119 and accompanying text (demonstrating
the view that express incapacity need not be found, but that the report of the physician
admitting the patient to the nursing home may be sufficient); see also infra notes 258-260
and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (recounting one of the central
issues in Owens as whether the authority of the attorney-in-fact applied to health care
decisions).
246. See cases cited supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (listing the central
question for a proxy as whether an arbitration agreement constitutes a health care
decision); see also supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (summarizing the Flores
decision which held that decisions to arbitrate were not health care decisions under the
surrogate statute).
247. See cases cited supra notes 78, 98-108 and accompanying text (showing the
different conclusions of various courts regarding whether an arbitration agreement
constitutes a health care decision).
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248attorney. However, the court reached its conclusion by asserting that
"the decision to admit [the patient] to a nursing home clearly constitutes
a health care decision. ',249 While a decision to admit a patient to the
nursing home is likely a health care decision, a decision to bind the
patient to arbitration of disputes is beyond the scope of a health care
decision. 25° In California, Florida, and Texas, courts have narrowly
interpreted the meaning of health care decisions to those relating to life-
prolonging procedures or consent to treatment.
251
ii. Personal Representative
The term "personal representative" lacks definition, and even if the
non-patient signs as a personal representative, he or she does not actually
possess legal authority to bind the patient.252 The court in Noland Health
Services, Inc. noted that even though the daughter-in-law admitting the
patient signed as the "personal representative," she never possessed a
power of attorney, and thus the arbitration agreement was not binding. 3
On the other hand, in MN MedInvest Co., L.P., the court found that an
arbitration agreement was binding on a child where the parent signed as
"personal representative., 54 The court found authority from the doctrine
of necessities, not from a legal definition of a "personal
,,255representative.
iii. Surrogate
Statutory or surrogate authority of the next of kin when signing an
arbitration agreement highlights another split of court opinion regarding
signors with authority.256 First, the patient must be deemed incompetent;
second, the signor must be in the statutory class of people granted
248. See case cited supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (citing Owens v. Nat'l
Health Corp., No. M2005-01272-SC-R11-CV, 2007 WL 3284669 (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2007)).
249. See case cited supra note 78 and accompanying text.
250. See cases cited supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (discussing Blankfeld
v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) and Texas
Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App. 2007)).
251. See cases cited supra notes 98-108, 120-121 and accompanying text
(representing a narrow interpretation of health care decisions in the context of whether a
health care proxy or medical power of attorney has requisite authority to bind).
252. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (suggesting also that because the
signor was a daughter-in-law, the court was less persuaded to find her signature binding).
254. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting that even though the
arbitration clause was upheld under the necessities doctrine, the facts of the case
represent the lack of definition in the term "personal representative").
256. See supra notes 113-121 and accompanying text (summarizing cases involving
surrogate authority).
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authority, such as a spouse or child. 7  A finding of incapacity is the
most difficult of the issues for the court, particularly because oftentimes
there has never been a determination of capacity by medical personnel.
25 8
To handle this lack of determination, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
found that incapacity could be inferred from other records, such as the
report of the admitting physician. 9
On the other hand, if a statute requires specific certification of
incapacity, as in Texas Cityview Care Center, L.P., the court may refuse
to find incapacity absent such certification or express finding.260 The
crux of the problem is that the law presumes competency while the
nursing home admissions process presumes incompetency by virtue of
the fact that often the patient is not involved in the admissions process at
all.26' Without patient participation in the nursing home admission
process, the nursing home, in effect, makes an unofficial determination
of incapacity while the court refuses to find incapacity without an official
determination and therefore rejects the authority of the signor.
iv. Agent
Perhaps the most troublesome area of court interpretation regarding
signors is the use of agency theory to bind signors. Most courts have
rejected apparent authority theories to bind signors, including as applied
to spouses. 262 Court reasoning focuses on the actions of the principal that
evidence a grant of authority to the signor, as in Pagarigan v. Libby Care
Center, Inc. and a host of other cases.
263
However, patients are generally in no position to grant authority to
anyone, which is the very reason they are seeking care. 264 Consequently,
the Supreme Court of Alabama has adopted a more passive approach to
257. See cases cited supra notes 114, 117 and accompanying text (highlighting court
analysis requiring a finding of incapacity and a signature by a family member).
258. See cases cited supra notes 115, 118-119 and accompanying text (suggesting that
patients often do not have express determinations of incapacity from their primary
physician, but incapacity is often present as evidenced by the surrounding
circumstances).
259. See cases cited supra notes 115, 118-119 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (finding no certification of
incompetence, the court refused to find that the daughter had authority to bind the patient
to an arbitration agreement).
261. See supra notes 115, 118-119 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 124-133 and accompanying text (summarizing cases where
apparent authority arguments were rejected).
263. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (illustrating that becoming an
agent requires more than the agent merely representing himself as such, but rather
requires a specific action by the principal).
264. See supra notes 115, 118-119 and accompanying text (highlighting that many
patients are not physically or mentally able to participate in the admissions process).
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determining apparent authority.265 Instead of focusing on the actions of
the principal, the Court held that apparent authority could be implied if
the principal "passively permits" the agent to appear to have authority.
266
Because many patients are neither present during the admissions process
nor have the mental acumen to give either active or passive authority to
another, agency theory must be further explored by the courts as it relates
to signing nursing home admissions documents.267
v. Third-Party Beneficiary
Finally, a significant concern regarding the binding nature of
arbitration agreements in wrongful death actions against nursing homes
is whether they are binding on third-party beneficiaries. 268 This issue is
unique to wrongful death actions because the patient is no longer alive to
bring the action.269 Once again, courts are divided. Trinity Mission of
Clinton, LLC, represents a significant decision of which all plaintiffs'
lawyers should take notice. 270  The patient did not sign the arbitration
agreement, and the court found that the son who admitted his mother
held no authority to bind the patient to arbitration.271 Nevertheless, the
court held that the arbitration agreement was binding on both the patient
and third-party beneficiaries.272  First, the court found that the patient
was bound by the agreement because she received benefit from it in the
form of care, room, and board.273 Second, the court noted that the third-
party beneficiaries were likewise bound because they replace the
deceased as claimants in a wrongful death action.274 In Covenant Health
Rehab of Picayune, L.P., the court similarly found that language in the
265. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text (explaining the Carraway
holding).
266. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that the "passive" criteria
meant that the patient did nothing to prevent her brother from acting on her behalf).
267. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 139-152 and accompanying text (summarizing court opinions
regarding third-party beneficiaries).
269. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (providing an example of a
beneficiary bringing a wrongful death claim on behalf of the deceased patient).
270. See case cited supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text (suggesting that if all
courts came to the same conclusion as in Barber, all third-party beneficiaries would be
bound by arbitration agreements regardless of whether an arbitration agreement was
signed at all).
271. See case cited supra note 140 and accompanying text.
272. See case cited supra note 143 and accompanying text.
273. See case cited supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
274. Id. (noting also that there was no determination of patient incapacity, which may
have factored into the court's decision).
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arbitration agreement that was binding on the "estate" of the deceased
included the third-party beneficiaries that had filed suit.
275
By contrast, in In re Kepka, the court held that a wrongful death
claim is personal to the statutory beneficiaries. 76 Therefore, although
the estate of the deceased would have been bound by the arbitration
agreement, the wife was not bound in her individual capacity. 77 In
Mississippi, children of the deceased are forced to arbitrate, while in
Texas, even a spouse may proceed to litigate a wrongful death claim.
278
Both viewpoints illustrate the uniqueness of nursing home arbitration
agreements that require special attention by courts and legislatures due to
the collision of deference to arbitration, common law tort principles,
statutory authority, and considerations of the health care industry.279
vi. Separate Signature on Arbitration Provision
Plaintiffs should be aware that they may refuse to sign the specific
arbitration provisions.28 ° Courts seem willing to validate the signor's
rejection of arbitration provisions, through actions such as crossing out
the language, or refusing to initial or sign near the arbitration provision,
as occurred in Bedford Care Center-Monroe Hall, LLC.28 1 Plaintiffs'
lack of understanding of their right to reject arbitration provisions seems
to be their nemesis, rather than not exercising that right.282
275. See case cited supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text (pointing out that the
court did not make a specific finding as to whether the third-party beneficiaries were
deemed "heirs" or otherwise part of the "estate," as defined in the arbitration agreement);
see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (listing several cases in Texas that have
held a wrongful death action can only be filed where the person injured would have been
able to sue if he or she was still alive, but the holding does not satisfy the issue of
whether third parties may be bound by arbitration).
276. See case cited supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text (summarizing the In
re Kepka case).
277. Id.
278. See cases cited supra notes 139-143, 144-146, 147-149 and accompanying text
(contrasting the views of Mississippi courts in finding third parties in privity to the
admissions contract, with a Texas court which held that wrongful death claims are
personal to the individual).
279. See supra notes 19, 96-121, 137-149 and accompanying text (summarizing the
various federal and state statutes at issue in determining whether arbitration agreements
bind third-party beneficiaries).
280. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text (highlighting the Bedford Care
Center-Monroe Hall, LLC v. Lewis holding).
281. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (referencing the need to have
separate documents and signatures for arbitration agreements); see also supra note 90 and
accompanying text (inferring that had the mother crossed out the arbitration clause in the
admissions contract, it may not have been enforceable).
282. See supra notes 73-187 and accompanying text (pointing out the various cases in
which the plaintiff did not understand the arbitration provisions being signed).
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In summary, case law is confusing at best as to who may make
binding arbitration agreement decisions. The confusion regarding
signors is compounded by the fragile nature of patients and the lack of
statutory and common law guidelines to deal with a business model of
arbitration in a health care setting.
2. Unconscionability
Court analysis of unconscionability is more defined than signature
authority, and the common law has been sufficiently developed in the
area. 283 Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff must show more
than a contract of adhesion to prove unconscionability, and that a
contract of adhesion does not make the contract per se unconscionable.
284
i. Procedural Unconscionability
Probably the biggest area of litigation in nursing home arbitration
agreements in wrongful death claims, aside from signature issues, is
procedural unconscionability.2 85 Plaintiffs routinely ask the court to deny
motions to compel arbitration due to the inconspicuousness of the
arbitration language, lack of explanation that the agreement meant a
waiver of rights, and lack of understanding or voluntariness.
286
The holdings from several jurisdictions present a robust set of
factors that should give clear guidance to nursing homes regarding
contract terms and admissions procedures. 287  Buraczynski v. Eyring
instructs that arbitration agreements should be on a separate document,
clearly marked with bold headings, explain in capital letters that the
acceptance of the agreement means a waiver of rights, and allow for
revocation within thirty days.288 Vicksburg Partners, L.P. further adds
that the agreement should include text drawing attention to the fact that
289signing the agreement is voluntary. In addition, the courts in Miller
and Carraway v. Beverly Enterprises Alabama, Inc. approved of stating
283. See supra notes 154-160 and accompanying text (illustrating the presence of
fairly clear and consistent common law rules for interpreting unconscionability, such as
the need to find both procedural and substantive unconscionability in most jurisdictions
and definitions of both types of unconscionability).
284. See supra notes 165, 206-207 and accompanying text (defining adhesion
contracts as one-sided, without meaningful options).
285. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 162-171 and accompanying text (reviewing plaintiff procedural
unconscionability arguments).
287. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (listing the factors).
288. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (recounting the effects of the
Buraczynski holding and resulting factors).
289. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text (summarizing the
considerations of the court in Stephens).
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within the agreement that acceptance was not a condition for
admission.290
External factors also bear on the court's decision to enforce the
arbitration clause. 291 The illiteracy of the patient, for instance, does not
render the agreement per se procedurally unconscionable.292 However,
the nursing home must still explain provisions to patients and allow time
for questions to be answered, regardless of the patient's intelligence or
sophistication.293
ii. Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability is also well-defined at common
law.294 It is perhaps easier to spot than procedural unconscionability,
although there is still substantial litigation surrounding alleged unfair
terms, such as whether limits on damages or waivers of punitive damages
are unconscionable.29'
Certain provisions are routinely declared substantively
unconscionable, including: (1) placing caps on economic or non-
economic damages; 296 (2) waiving punitive damages;297 (3) granting a
unilateral right to reject an arbitrator's decision; 298 (4) allowing litigation
for payment disputes while requiring arbitration for all other disputes;
299
(5) requiring the party challenging the arbitration agreement to pay all
costs or "loser-pay" provisions; 30 0 (6) attempting to shorten the statute of
limitations;30 1 and (7) forfeiting all claims except those involving willful
acts.302
290. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (noting the similar finding in
the cases from two different jurisdictions).
291. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text (finding that illiteracy was one
factor among many to determine procedural unconscionability).
293. See supra notes 169, 171 and accompanying text (representing the general view
that patients must receive adequate explanations of the terms of the contract to avoid
procedural unconscionability).
294. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (reviewing common law
interpretation of substantive unconscionability as the presence of oppressive terms
representing gross disparity or the altering of legal rights, as evidenced by looking at the
four comers of the document).
295. See supra notes 177-186 and accompanying text (highlighting provisions that
have been determined to be substantively unconscionable).
296. See supra notes 177, 181 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 177, 182 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 177, 184 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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However, the mere existence of an arbitration provision that
requires parties to arbitrate disputes is not per se substantively
unconscionable.3 °3 Moreover, even unconscionable provisions are often
severed from the arbitration agreement and the remaining terms
enforced. 3
D. Other Arguments
1. Void as Against Public Policy
Similar to unconscionability, plaintiffs argue that arbitration
agreements in nursing home contracts are per se void as against public
policy, although no court has concluded the same.30 5 Florida courts have
extensively discussed public policy arguments.30 6 In Blankfeld, the court
declared an arbitration agreement void against public policy when the
agreement called for use of NHLA arbitration rules that required a clear
and convincing standard of proof for negligent acts as opposed to the
Florida statutory preponderance of the evidence standard.30 7 Because of
the conflicting standards, the court found the arbitration agreement
simply could not stand as void against public policy. 308 Florida courts
have since invalidated similar arbitration agreements that represent a
conflicting standard of proof 309 Nursing homes should learn from such
decisions and remove provisions that rely on a higher standard of proof.
Some courts blur the unconscionability and void as against public
policy arguments.310 In Alterra, the court held that a cap on non-
economic damages and waiver of punitive damages were void as against
public policy. 311 However, the distinction is immaterial since treatment
of a voided provision is similar to that of an unconscionable term-the
303. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (representing current precedent that
mandatory arbitration provisions are not unconscionable).
304. See supra notes 175, 176 and accompanying text (noting that the court prefers to
validate the arbitration agreement after striking unconscionable terms, but will not rewrite
the agreement).
305. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text (referencing current
jurisprudence relating to void as against public policy arguments and listing cases in
which the court rejected the argument that arbitration agreements in nursing home
contracts were void as against public policy).
306. See supra notes 190-197 and accompanying text (summarizing the Blankfeld,
Place at Vero Beach, and SA-PG-Ocala holdings).
307. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text (referring to the Place at Vero
Beach and SA-PG-Ocala decisions).
310. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
311. Id.
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voided provision is struck and the remainder of the agreement is
upheld.312
2. "Other Consideration"
Time and again, courts in various jurisdictions have rejected the
"other consideration" argument.313 Two grounds exist for rejection.
First, the language in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(iii) governing
Medicaid payments was intended to prohibit extra monetary fees or gifts
in admissions contracts, not arbitration provisions.314 Second, the court
in Miller actually found consideration for an arbitration agreement in the
form of a "reciprocal exchange of benefit and detriment., 315  Under
either approach, the argument appears to be unpersuasive.
3. Waiver of Arbitration Due to Being an "Active Participant"
Plaintiffs should take note of Estate of Orlanis ex rel. Marks in
which the nursing home waived its right to arbitration by engaging in
extensive discovery prior to moving to compel arbitration. 31 6  Often
defendants will investigate options to determine their chances of success
in challenging a suit versus settling the issue prior to extensive litigation
costs. 3 17  Such investigation may amount to extensive discovery that
precludes arbitration.31 8
E. Recommendations for Change
As with any emerging area of law, many steps, both large and small,
can be taken by all stakeholders to improve contract provisions and
procedures. The fairly recent collision of the use of arbitration
agreements, common law tort principles, statutory provisions, and health
care industry standards raises significant questions regarding the validity
of predispute mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home
312. See supra notes 200 and accompanying text (noting that the court eliminated the
offending damage provisions and validated the remainder of the agreement).
313. See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text (noting that the court found that
virtually any contract term could be argued as "other consideration" if the court started
down that slippery slope).
315. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (finding a bargained for exchange in
limiting the available forum for disputes to arbitration).
316. See case cited supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that the defendant
engaged in interrogatories and requested documents prior to moving to compel
arbitration).
317. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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contracts.3 19  However, increased litigation also presents a ripe
opportunity for any one improvement to alleviate the whole.3 20 Below
are some suggestions to avoid collisions in the future.
1. Exclude Wrongful Death Actions from Predispute Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements
First, nursing home arbitration agreements should exclude wrongful
death actions from predispute mandatory arbitration provisions. A line
must be drawn at requiring arbitrations for negligent acts leading to
death. Neither patients nor signors can anticipate the quality of care at a
nursing facility or the possible negligence that may result. Caretakers
have little choice of where to take a patient with poor health. Predispute
mandatory arbitration agreements encompassing wrongful death actions
signed during a typically difficult admissions process pertaining to
emergency health needs should be per se void as against public policy or
per se unconscionable. 32' Wrongful death actions afford plaintiffs
important opportunities to vindicate the death of their loved one. As the
wronged party, the beneficiaries should be in the driver's seat, not the
alleged offending party, in choosing a forum to resolve their dispute.
322
Besides, even nursing homes are currently not receiving the benefits
of some of the cost savings from arbitration agreements because courts
are denying motions to compel arbitration roughly half of the time.
323
Even successful motions to compel arbitration of wrongful death claims
incur significant litigation costs.
32 4
2. Change Current Contract Provisions and Admissions
Procedures
Second, even if arbitration agreements did not exclude wrongful
death actions, nursing home contracts should contain key provisions to
ensure maximum understanding and fairness. Courts have given
guidance on provisions and procedures that are fair to both parties.325
319. See supra notes 16-207 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (highlighting the recent rise in
nursing home litigation).
321. See supra notes 73-207 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties family
members and caretakers have experienced interpreting paperwork while admitting a
patient to a nursing home under stressful conditions).
322. Id. (suggesting that the rise in litigation represents a desire of beneficiaries to
bring closure to the death of the their loved one).
323. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting that court decisions upholding
arbitration agreements result in higher court costs for both plaintiff and nursing home).
325. See supra notes 285-304 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, to avoid procedural unconscionability, arbitration
agreements in nursing home contracts should include: (1) space for a
signature; (2) bold typeface and clear headings; (3) clear statements
about waiver of rights to a jury trial; (3) a thirty-day revocation period;
(4) definitions of the authority of the respective signors; and
(5) statements indicating that signing the arbitration agreement is not a
condition of admissions.326
In addition, to avoid substantive unconscionability, the arbitration
agreement should not contain the following provisions: (1) a cap on
economic or non-economic damages; (2) a waiver of punitive damages;
(3) a unilateral right to reject an arbitrator's decision; (4) an allowance of
litigation for payment disputes while requiring arbitration for all other
disputes; (5) a requirement that the party challenging the arbitration
agreement pay all costs or "loser-pay" provisions; (6) a shortening of the
statute of limitations; or (7) forfeiture of all claims except those
involving willful acts.327 In terms of procedure, nursing homes should
clearly explain the terms in the admissions process and allow an
opportunity to review the agreement and ask questions.328
3. Clarify Signor Authority and What Constitutes a "Health
Care" Decision
Third, signor authority must be clarified to avoid confusion for both
parties regarding who may bind the patient to arbitration. Unlike
contract terms that nursing homes can fix, there is less that can be done
by nursing homes to ensure those in authority sign the admissions
contract. 329 Nursing homes are reliant on court interpretation to resolve
questions of authority.
330
Because the current signor titles are largely artificial, court analysis
of authority should shift from the title of the signor to a proposed two-
step process: (1) a determination of patient capacity; and (2) a
determination of whether the patient conveyed authority to another to
make contractual decisions. In addition, health care decisions should be
326. See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
unconscionability factors).
327. See supra notes 296-302 and accompanying text (analyzing provisions that have
been held substantively unconscionable).
328. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 9, 73-187 and accompanying text (noting the efforts of nursing
homes to clarify the title or authority of the signor of the admissions agreement, yet the
arbitration agreement was found binding in only half of the cases).
330. See supra notes 73-207 and accompanying text (suggesting nursing home
reliance on court interpretation of the authority of the signatory and terms found to be
procedurally or substantively unconscionable).
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distinguished from contractual decisions, and should not include
decisions to arbitrate.
Relating to a determination of capacity, courts should develop a
factor test for capacity specific to nursing home patients in order to
determine whether statutory, surrogate, or agency authority has been
conveyed to family or non-family member signors. Patients often hover
between capacity and incapacity when admitted to nursing homes.33'
The introduction of arbitration agreements has forced the issue of
whether incapacity must be found in order to convey authority.332
Currently courts have applied both narrow and broad standards that must
be clarified.333
Significant to finding whether a patient has conveyed authority to
another, courts must further refine apparent authority agency theory, as
applied to the nursing home context. Similar to issues of determining
capacity, the patient often cannot expressly grant authority to another,
and passive grants of authority are largely unfair since the patient does
not knowingly transfer authority.334 Apparent authority should at the
very least be predicated on a physician's finding vis-a-vis capacity.
Health care decisions should not include decisions to arbitrate.
Neither a health care proxy, nor medical attorney-in-fact, nor surrogate
should be found by the court to possess authority to make arbitration
decisions. All such statutes refer to the ability of the next of kin or proxy
to make "health care" decisions. Such decisions should be narrowly
defined as relating to "medical care" and should not be broadened to
include non-medical care decisions absent legislation. If legislatures
choose to broaden the definition, they should incorporate arbitration
agreements in their statutory definitions of "health care decisions.
3 35
4. Do Not Bind Third-Party Beneficiaries
Courts should not bind third-party beneficiaries to predispute
mandatory arbitration agreements. The very nature of the wrongful
death action sounds in common law theory as a vindication of loss due to
the negligence of another. 336  Consequently, third-party beneficiaries
331. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 115, 118-119 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text (noting the different court
findings related to capacity).
334. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text (noting the statutory definitions
of health care decisions in Texas and Florida).
336. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (providing an example of a scenario
in which beneficiaries sought vindication for nursing home negligence).
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ought to not be bound by arbitration for future negligent acts leading to
death when they are not in privity with the admissions contract.
5. Develop Federal Case Law Precedent
Finally, the United States Supreme Court should be heard on
whether arbitration agreements are enforceable in nursing home contracts
and under what circumstances. An increased number of cases need to
make their way through the federal court system so that the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to rule on the issues and guide lower courts.
The conflicts in interpreting the FAA, MFA, and SSA alone warrant
further guidance.337
V. CONCLUSION
In general, many actions are quite suitable for arbitration and
arbitration provides a viable alternative to litigation for both plaintiff and
defendant. But, predispute mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing
home contracts should exclude wrongful death actions. The
circumstances surrounding the admission of the patient to a nursing
home are confusing at best, and no patient or signor anticipates death
from the negligent acts of the nursing home. Court opinion points out
that plaintiffs are not losing any rights in a well-drafted and fair
admissions process but are merely changing the forum for resolution of
their disputes.338 However, in wrongful death actions, the beneficiaries
should be in the driver's seat when seeking vindication for negligent acts
leading to the death of a loved one, such as choosing the desired forum
after the dispute arises, not before.
In the absence of excluding wrongful death actions from nursing
home arbitration agreements, many opportunities exist to ensure greater
fairness in both the agreement provisions and the admissions process.
Nursing homes should take cues from the courts and remove provisions
from admissions agreements that are routinely held unconscionable by
the courts. Courts should clarify various issues such as whether the
FAA, other federal law, or state law applies, and who has authority to
bind the party to arbitration upon signing the agreement. Legislatures
could substantially aid in the process by defining whether "health care
decisions" include agreements to arbitrate. By working together and
clarifying the issues, plaintiffs, nursing homes, courts, and legislatures
can improve predispute mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing
337. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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home admissions contracts, particularly as applied to wrongful death
claims, and make the agreements "more" right.

